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The Islamic State: A Clash within the Muslim Civilization for the 
New Caliphate 
Marco Marsili* 
Center for International Studies (CEI-IUL), University Institute of Lisbon (ISCTE-IUL), Lisbon, Portugal 
ABSTRACT 
This study analyzes the political reasons that allowed the Islamic State to expand successfully 
in Syria and Iraq, by enabling to 'franchise' worldwide, and the role of the regional 
governments in this issue. The essay provides a different explanation from the classic 
approach of the "clash of civilizations" theorized by Samuel P. Huntington, ascribing 
responsibility for the growth and expansion of the Islamic State to the complex framework of 
geopolitical alliances within the Muslim civilization and the Arab world. The paper highlights 
the attempt by Turkey to establish itself as a regional power and guidance of the Islamic 
world, by resurrecting the Caliphate, and, based on this, explains the contrast with the Islamic 
State, which goal is the foundation of a globalized Caliphate. The plans of the Turkish 
President Erdoğan for a Great Turkey, allied with Egypt, have foundered with the coup that 
ousted the Muslim Brotherhood from power. The study relates the connection of Ankara with 
the Kurds, regarding the management of the crisis in Syria and Iraq, and the Turkish liaison 
with regional powers (Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel) and other powers (Russia, Cina 
and USA). 
Address correspondence to Marco Marsili, Center for International Studies (CEI-IUL), University Institute of 
Lisbon (ISCTE-IUL), Av. das Forças Armadas, 1649-026 Lisbon, Portugal. Email: info@marcomarsili.it. 
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Introduction 
Formerly known to Western governments at least since 2004 as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) , the 1
Islamic State has been establihed in 2006, when the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), a 
sunni umbrella organization, joined with several smaller Iraqi insurgent groups opposing the 
US military presence, gaving birth to the first version of the organization called "Islamic State 
of Iraq" (ISI). 
 By taking advantage of the "Arab Spring" of 2011 in Syria, which pushed the 
opposition to the regime of Bashar al-Assad to revolt against the government of Damascus, 
the Islamic State infiltrated the demonstrators, changing the genetic nature of the conflict, and 
militarisation of the conflict. 
 Two years later, the organization, which brings together Iraqis and Syrians 
mujahideen, changes the original name in the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (formally 
the "Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham"), and only then it is identified as a terrorist 
organization under that name . The move is opposed by Al-Qaeda, which until then held the 2
undisputed leadership among the jihadists. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is 
a formidable competitor to Al-Qaeda, both in financial terms, because of the resources that 
can catalyze and collect, distracting from those available to the organization led by Ayman al-
Zawahiri, both by the human resources, the fighters, which ISIL is able to enlist removing 
them from the availability of the latter. 
 In June 2014, the organization proclaimed itself to be a Worldwide Caliphate, and took 
its current name of "Islamic State". This decision, which provides a political and religious 
vision on a global scale, caused a wave of memberships by groups of Muslim fighters 
spreaded across the planet. 
 The military successes of the IS, together with a communications strategy winning, 
have placed it into direct competition with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and 
even in Afghanistan, a stronghold of Taliban and Al-Queda. The trademark of the Islamic 
State ('the franchisor'), with its black flags, its efficient and multi-channel communication, 
and its parastatal organization, has spread globally as a sort of  'franchise'.  
 Affiliations to the brand IS ('the franchisees') follow one another all over the planet: in 
July 2014, Abu Sayyaf declares itself associated in the Philippines; in February 2015 the 
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majority of Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen dissented from al-Qaeda and pledged allegiance to ISIL, 
followed in March by Boko Haram - which gives ISIL an official presence in Nigeria, Niger, 
Chad and Cameroon - by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and by the sharia senior 
official of Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, Abdullah Al-Libi, who defected with a number of 
fighters. 
 With the escalation of the war in Iraq and Syria, it is likely that these two countries 
will collapse under the advance of the jihadists, and this pushed sixty countries to form a 
Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant . How can the IS achieve 3
so many successes in the military? 
The Struggle for the Caliphate 
Contrary to the argument by Samuel P. Huntington in his 1993 article in Foreign Affairs 
magazine , which later expanded in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 4
Order (1996), we are not in front of a plain "clash of civilizations", but rather a "clash within 
the Islamic civilization" or within the "Muslim civilization", as we can call it.  
 According to Berman, conflict arises because of philosophical beliefs various groups 
share (or do not share), regardless of cultural or religious identity . In the present day do not 5
exist distinct cultural boundaries, and there is no "Islamic civilization" nor a "Western 
civilization", especially when considering relationships such as that between the United States 
and Saudi Arabia . The classic Huntington approach omits the dynamic interdependency and 6
interaction of culture which now exists between the West and Islam. 
 Anyway, leaving out the classic and simplistic approach of Huntington, the struggle 
for supremacy in the Muslim world represents, for the IS but a prelude to a "global clash of 
civilizations": this conflict is part and parcel of wider Islamic State objective aimed at the 
ultimate establishment of a globalized Caliphate. 
 The proclamation of the Caliphate, if on one hand triggered a series of political 
affiliations at global level, on the other hand alarmed Muslim states, which see in the self-
proclaimed Islamic State a threat to their independence and sovereignty. The Caliphate, by its 
nature, is a theological state, syncretically understood as political and religious unity. The 
challenge for the recovery of the Caliphate is a challenge on two fronts: to Muslim states, on 
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the strictly political and military, and to the Muslim religion, on the theological–confessional. 
Thus, the Caliphate is in direct competition, both in terms of “statehood,” both in terms of 
religion, with the existing entities, as Sunni Muslims developed the belief that the caliph is a 
temporal political ruler, appointed to rule within the bounds of Islamic law (Sharia) . 7
Organized and run as a true state, with a cabinet of advisers and local governors, actually IS 
controls territory in Iraq, Syria, Sinai, and eastern Libya, and has also members in Morocco, 
Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Israel and Palestine, but claims to extend its power in Libya, Egypt 
(Sinai Peninsula), Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Algeria, Afghanistan and Pakistan . 8
 The IS is a Salafist movement within Sunni Islam , aiming to return to the early days 9
of Islam, rejecting all innovations in the religion, which it believes corrupts its original spirit. 
It condemns later Caliphates and the Ottoman Empire for deviating from what it calls pure 
Islam , and seeks to revive the original Wahhabi project of the restoration of the Caliphate 10
governed by strict Salafist doctrine . Following Salafi-Wahhabi tradition - a Sunni doctrine 11
distinguished by its literal reading of Islam which rejects any form of social modernity  - 12
ISIL condemns the followers of secular law as disbelievers, putting the current Saudi 
government in that category. 
 Many Muslim states, almost all of them hereditary monarchies, have claimed to be 
caliphates . The last Caliphate recognized in most of the Sunni world was that of the 13
Ottomans , but for Shia scholars caliphate was "the flagship institution" of Sunni, not Shia, 14
authority . The last Ottoman Caliph, Abdülmecid II - the successor of Mehmet VI, which, 15
besides being the hundredth Caliph of Islam, was once the thirty-sixth and last sultan of the 
Ottoman Empire - was revoked by a special assembly held in Ankara on 3 March 1924 on the 
instructions of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk: Turkey took the path of building a secular republican 
state. 
The Kurdish Identity 
Turkey, if on one hand is the guarantor of the secular state, having abolished the caliphate 
"resurrected" by the IS, on the other hand is involved in part by the issue of the Kurds, a total 
population of about 30–35 million, mostly inhabiting a contiguous area spanning adjacent 
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parts of southeastern Turkey, western Iran, northern Iraq, and northern Syria , calling for self-16
determination and for the establishment of a fully independent Kurdistan.  
 The Kurds, which are Sunni Muslims, and abhorred the radical secularization of 
Turkey and centralization of authority, which marginalized them , were victims of ethnic 17
cleansing . The Kurds are a rough estimate of 14.5 million in Turkey (18 percent of 81.6 18
million), 6 million in Iran (10 percent of 80.8 million), about 5 to 6 million in Iraq (15-20 
percent of 32.6 million), and less than 2 million in Syria (Kurds, Armenians, and other 9.7 
percent of 17.9 million), which adds up to close to 28 million Kurds . According to higher 19
estimates 25 percent of Turkey is Kurdish , which would raise the population figure by about 20
5 million. The political representation of the Kurds, both in Turkey and in neighboring Iran 
and Syria, is diverse, and reflects different choices and viewpoints.  
 At the Turkish general elections held on 7 June 2015 the pro-Kurdish party Peoples' 
Democratic Party (Halklarin Demokratik Partisi or HDP) crossed the 10 percent electoral 
threshold and emerged as a potent force in national politics after taking more than 13.12 
percent of the vote, equivalent to 6,058,150 ballots . Islamist-rooted Justice and 21
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or AKP) lost its parliamentary majority after 
thirteen years in power. The opposition HDP found itself in the position to scuttle President 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's plans to change the constitution to give presidency much stronger 
executive power.  
 As it was not possible to form a government that could obtain a vote of confidence, 
Prime Minister and Chairman of the Justice and Development Party, Ahmet Davutoğlu, 
returned the mandate to President Erdoğan  who called early elections blaming HDP for 22
"incidents, which caused 50 deaths" and accusing the opposition party of being "backed by 
the separatist terrorist organization" PKK . 23
 The tension between the Turkish president party and the Peoples' Democratic Party 
resulted in heavy accusations: responding to the HDP Co-Chairperson Demirtaş's allegations 
about the Suruç attack, Erdoğan accused him to be "the main person responsible for the 
massacre on October 6-7-8 that resulted in 50 death" . 24
 The HDP chose, with success, to undertake a political struggle within Turkey, unlike 
the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê or PKK), a nationalist 
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organization based in Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan, listed as a terrorist organization 
internationally by the European Union  and many governments, including the US , UK , 25 26 27
Australia , New Zealand , Canada , Japan , and Germany  among the others. In the past 28 29 30 31 32
PKK was backed by Iraq, Iran, and Syria . These latter pervceive the Turkish accession to 33
European Union  as a threat, just like the presence of Ankara within the North Atlantic 34
Alliance . 35
 While the Kurds fought to liberate by the IS the territories in which they live, until the 
attacks of July 2015 Ankara did not take more forceful action to combat IS, as this would 
involve assistance to the Kurdish militants. However Turkey agreed to support the Peshmerga 
forces of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq. Ankara's move had the aim 
to strengthen the moderate government of Barzani, in strong contrast to Baghdad, and in this 
way weaken the extremist fringes of Kurdish nationalism. Moreover the Turks seek to 
strengthen their role as a European hub for hydrocarbons, thanks to agreements with the 
government of Erbil, thus making Ankara the crossroads of energy resources from Asia and 
the Middle East. 
 While maintaining a good relationship with Turkey, the Kurdistan Regional 
Government could take advantage from the current situation in Iraq, increasing its 
independence from Baghdad. Relations between the KRG and the Federal Government of Iraq 
are stretched because of tension regarding the oil policies implemented from Erbil in relations 
with Turkish and Iranian  neighbors. After having dealed with Tehran for supply of heavy 36
weaponry and military training to fight IS militians - the relations between Kurdistan Region 
and Islamic Republic of Iran are described as "good and positive"  - KRG has turned to 37
Ankara , now worried as the Iranian influence in Kurdish territories continues to escalate 38
thanks to the Syrian crisis. Eventually Ankara provided military assistance to the Kurdistan 
Region, as IS poses as a threat to Turkey as well.  
 The Turks are able to contain Iranian influence in the region, thanks to their role in the 
market of oil and gas: "Turkey buys 90-95 percent of Iran's natural gas export", that's "the 
most expensive natural gas from Iran", and also buy electricity from Tehran, demonstrating 
"the depth of [Turkish] solidarity" said President Erdoğan in a joint press conference with 
President Rouhani . 39
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 Budget cuts by the Iraqi central government and attacks by the Islamic State caused 
severe economic crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan. To overcome the crisis, the KRG made an oil export 
agreement with the Federal government of Iraq which Baghdad failed to pay the KRG , 40
causing the economic crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan to worsen . 41
 While Baghdad is opposing KRG agreements, Erbil takes every opportunity to stress 
that "the [Iraqi] federal Constitution gives primacy to regional law"  in oil and gas policies, 42
and that "All oil contracts in the Region fall within the KRG oil and gas law" according to the 
law passed by the Kurdistan parliament in 2007 "and fully in line with the relevant provisions 
of the [Iraqi] permanent Constitution" . 43
 Iraq currently is a parliamentary republic in which Islam is the state religion . The 44
administrative division consists of 18 governorates (or provinces). Any single province, or 
group of provinces, is entitled to request that it be recognized as a Region with wide 
autonomy . These provisions have not yet been implemented, but the country's future 45
Regions to be established could be: the three Kurdish provinces in the north of the country, 
already autonomous since the first Gulf War of 1991, will form a confederation of this kind; it 
is very likely that their example will be followed by nine Shiite provinces in the south, while 
the political and administrative fate of the six central provinces (three of which are in strong 
majority Sunni, while the other three - including the capital Baghdad - are mixed) appears 
uncertain. 
 After the Second Gulf War of 2003, the country has not yet been stabilized and there is 
an ongoing low-intensity war which opposes the foreign troops, the army of the new Iraqi 
government and the militias of some factions (especially the Kurds and some Shiite political 
parties, which represent more than half of Iraq's population) to heterogeneous groups, 
composed mainly of Sunnis (already in power under the previous regime and now partially 
excluded from key government). 
 In the Shiite south any attempts to rebellion were repressed by the central government 
and most of the political leaders, with strong ties to Iran, had to flee into exile. 
 Many Sunnis, who represented the Iraqi elite since the independence of the country 
until the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein, which constituted the military cadres, 
established armed groups both secular (former Ba’athists) and religious (Islamic). Such 
  8
groups have often allied with jihadists from abroad belonging to clearly terrorist groups such 
as Ansar al-Islam (Partisans of Islam), formed in 1998 as a breakaway faction of Islamist 
Kurds, splitting off from a group, the, splitting off from a group, the Islamic Movement of 
Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK), ruled by al-Zarqawi , and improperly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq 46
(AQI). Ansar fighters clashed with Kurdish fighters from the PUK, one of the two mainstream 
Iraqi Kurdish parties . 47
 The Kurds, represented by relatively secular parties - the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, 
or PUK, who expressed the last two presidents of the country, both non-Arab, and the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party, or KDP, which is in power in Kurdistan Regional Government - 
and by Islamic parties, are the most loyal US allies in Iraq, although they were forced to give 
up their aspirations for full independence, content to a wide autonomy from Baghdad as a 
"regional authority" . 48
 The government of Erbil advantage of the situation that had arisen following the 
actions of the IS in Iraqi territory, to occupy disputed territories outside of its administration , 49
such as Mosul, Sinjar, Zummar and Kobani (a town in Syrian Kurdistan lying immediately 
south of the border with Turkey), to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. 
 Turkey granted passage for the Peshmerga to travel through its territory to Kobani to 
fight IS militants . After the liberation of the town, Peshmerga forces returned home, 50
according to KRG's Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs. Although officially there is no record of 
agreements in this regard with Turkey, it is likely that this was a condition imposed by Ankara 
to authorize the transit of troops of Erbil on its territory. The Turkish government has 
provided a 500 USD million loan to the Kurdish Regional Government to be paid back 
through Kurdish crude oil exports . 51
 The relations between Turkey and KRG witnessed significant progress over the past 
few years. The interdependence between Ankara and Erbil, while for the more radical 
militants is a compromise that could jeopardize the achievement of an independent Kurdish 
state, on the other hand may be seen as an efficient means of "energy diplomacy" as a kind of 
"soft power". 
 Ankara proved reluctant in front of the American initiative to support the Syrian 
fighters which face the Islamic State, knowing that among them there are many members of 
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the PKK that, once ceased the conflict, can put the training and weapons at the available to the 
struggle for the establishment of the state of Kurdistan. According to KRG until now 16 
countries had sent weapons and ammunition and military aid to the Kurdistan Region and that 
ten countries have military advisors present in the Kurdistan Region . While the United 52
States sees radical Sunni Islam as the threat in the form of ISIL and al-Qaida, Turkey sees that 
threat as secondary to their worries about Assad and the Kurds, as training can bolster the 
Syrian opposition which has no interest in fighting the Islamic State. For the Turks "the 
problems in Syria and Iraq" are not questions "between Sunnis and Shiites" . 53
	 Turkish President Erdoğan stated he was troubled by the advance of Kurdish forces in 
the Tal Abyad region of northern Syria, saying that this could lead to the creation of a 
structure that threatens Turkish borders . Erdoğan has repeatedly expressed concern about the 54
West's bombing the Arabs and backing Kurdish forces - the Syrian Kurdish group the 
Democratic Union Party (PYD), and the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), of which 
Ankara considers the first an expression in Syria - saying it could lead to PKK domination of 
northern Syria.

 The agreements signed between KRG, on the one hand, and Turkey and Iran on the 
other, lead to think that the government of Erbil is considered a valid interlocutor to stem 
more radical Kurdish nationalism. Tehran, which has always opposed Baghdad, takes 
advantage of political friction between the Kurdish Regional Government and the Federal 
Government of Iraq. 
 Ankara also believes that supporting Erbil is the best way to disarm the Kurdish 
nationalism in Turkey, and, at the same time, to counter the threat of the IS, whose advance 
has caused a wave of refugees to its borders: 217,000 from Syria and 81,000 from Iraq by 
September 2014, with numbers expected to grow to 100,000 by year-end . According to 55
Turkish autohorities the number of refugees and asylum-seekers in Turkey in 2015 is expected 
to rise to nearly 1.9 million, including 1.7 million Syrian refugees. The exodus of Syrians to 
Turkey is less extensive that the one which has poured on Syria a million and two hundred 
thousand Iraqis, mostly Sunnis in 2007, when of the estimated two million Iraqis refugees 
sheltered in neighbouring states, at least 1.2 million to 1.5 million sought protection in 
Syria . 56
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 Relations between Ankara and Damascus, held out for a long time, due to the 
territorial dispute over Hatay, had entered a phase of detente in the late '90s. The Syrian crisis, 
border incidents, and the wave of refugees that has poured in Turkish territory, have 
deteriorated this friendly relationship. Turkey, where the laity have lost the government of the 
nation, could benefit from the fall of the secular regime of President Bashar al-Assad, now 
considered a bloody dictator, which does not allow the establishment of confessional parties.  
 The jihadists of the Islamic State could move undisturbed for a long time, along the 
Turkish-Syrian border (the "Gateway to Jihad"), thanks to the complaisance of the authorities 
of Ankara, at least until the attack with two car bombs exploded in the town of Reyhanlı, 
Hatay Province, Turkey, on 11 May 2013. At first all suspects were Turkish nationals that 
Ankara believed were backed by the Syrian government, but when ISIL accepted 
responsibility for the attack, Ankara turned his troops against the jihadists, launching 
airstrikes on Syrian territory. 
 Turkey has been accused of complicity with IS , even if the government declared that 57
"that Turkey has no relations with the terrorist organization Daesh or any other terrorist 
organization" . According to a research paper by David L. Phillips, Director of the Program 58
on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia University's Institute for the Study of Human 
Rights, "allegations range from military cooperation and weapons transfers to logistical 
support, financial assistance, and the provision of medical services" . Exporting oil from 59
siezed oilfields is a major source of funding of IS, and this activity can take place only 
through the Turkish territory. Without having any evidence, it cannot be said that Ankara is an 
accomplice of the Islamic State in the sale, through Turkish pipelines, of Syrian oil extracted 
in the areas occupied by jihadists, but it is clear that, if the jihadists finance themselves in this 
way, the oil must somehow get out of Syria, even if Ankara categorically rejects claims of 
supporting jihadists . 60
 Following the 20 July 2015 terrorist attack in Suruç, Turkey, and the separate 22 July 
attack in Ceylanpinar, for which the PKK has claimed responsibility , the strategy of Ankara 61
changed. After a phone call between Erdoğan and the US President Barack Obama , the 62
Turkish government allowed the use of the Incirlik air base to conduct counter-ISIL 
operations in support of "Operation Inherent Resolve" . The decision seems to be more due 63
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to the will to fight Kurdish nationalists of the PKK rather than jihadists. For the Turkish 
government "Daesh, PKK, DHKP-C […] are all terrorist organizations. Their names or 
differences do not change anything […]" . 64
 Is the same Turkish President Erdoğan who stresses the competition with the Islamic 
State: "I do not use the name ISIS, because it would mean recognizing a terrorist organization 
as a state while disrespecting Islam" . Turkish officials always speak of "Daesh" referring to 65
the organization led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. 
 Ankara's move to support the Unites States-led coalition, pushed ISIS to urge Turkish 
Muslims to rise up and overthrow "Satan" [President Recep Erdoğan] and to conquer 
Istanbul . In a video addressed to Turkish people, urging them uprising, an ISIS militant said 66
that "Turkish people should refuse to accept democracy, secularism, human laws, and all 
types of other evils" . The jihadist added that "Whoever follows the path of Atatürk and 67
disregards Sharia, allegedly become Satan themselves by befriending the Crusaders, apostates 
and atheists" . 68
Asymmetrical Interactions between Regional Actors 
The year of the Iranian Revolution and the intervention of Russia in Afghanistan (1979), 
stands out for the appearance of radical Islamic Shiite movements (e.g., Hezbollah in 
Lebanon) and Sunnis movements (Hamas, Al Qaeda and other organizations). The arrival on 
the scene of the United States in the funding of Afghan fighters (Talibans), in response to the 
intervention of the Soviet Union in Vietnam, marks the beginning of the support to some 
Islamic fundamentalist movements, which, in the following years, will become 
"uncomfortable", and hard to crack down. As late as December 1979 Soviet leaders remained 
hesitant about sending armed forces into the mountainous region of Southwest Asia. 
Gromyko, Andropov, and Ustinov endorsed an invasion of Afghanistan only when they were 
convinced that they had no choice other than to protect Moscow's dominance in the area 
against growing Islamic influence.  69
 Iran, an Islamic theocracy ruled by Shiites, where Arabs account for only 2 percent of 
the population , sees a danger in the fundamentalist Sunni Islamic State, as it represents a 70
challenge to the leadership within the more fundamentalist Muslim world. Is estimated that 
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87-90 percent of the world's Muslims are Sunni and only 10-13 percent (154-200 million) are 
Shia . 71
 The United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the powerful grouping of 
Sunni Arab Gulf monarchies , accused Tehran of "destabilizing activities in the region"  and 72 73
"affirmed their commitment to continue to support Syria's neighbors" . According to the US 74
Department of State, Iran is a "State Sponsors of Terrorism", providing financial, material, 
and logistical support to Iraqi Shia militant group, and other overwhelmingly Shiite 
organizations like Hezbollah in Leabanon and Sunni group like the Islamic Resistance 
Movement (Hamas) in Gaza . 75
 The Islamic State regards the Palestinian Sunni group Hamas  as apostates who have 76
no legitimate authority to lead jihad and it regards fighting the Islamic Resistance Movement 
as the first step toward confrontation with Israel, even if Hamas and Hezbollah - the fighting 
in Syria has reignited long-simmering tensions between Sunnis and Shiites - maintain a 
strategic partnership against Tel Aviv .  77
 Tehran is backed, both politically and militarily, from Moscow, which strongly 
defends the Assad regime : on 13 April 2015 the Russian President Vladimir Putin lifted the 78
UN ban and authorized the export of the S-300 air defence missile systems to Tehran , and it 79
has been reported that the Russian Federation invited a delegation of Hamas to visit 
Moscow . 80
 Support from Tehran for Hamas and Hezbollah , and for forces operating in Yemen , 81 82
as well as the supply of arms to Iran by Moscow , and the axis between the latter two on 83
Syria, concern Israel, which also feels threatened by the Iranian nuclear talks with 
Washington . 84
 While US President Barack Obama says that the agreement "will make our country, 
our allies, and the world safer and more secure" , the Israeli government opposes "a bad 85
deal" that "leaves Iran with a formidable nuclear infrastructure, which is unnecessary for 
peaceful energy production", accusing Tehran of supporting "worldwide terrorism" .   86
 According to Tel Aviv "The deal prematurely eases the pressure of sanctions on Iran" 
freeing "Many billions of dollars" which "will flow into Iran's coffers […] to expanding Iran's 
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worldwide terrorism, its regional campaign of conquest and aggression in Iraq, Syria, Yemen 
and Lebanon – as well as the terrorism it sponsors on Israel's borders". 
 Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu defined the agreement "an historic mistake 
for the world" as "Iran will receive hundreds of billions of dollars with which it can fuel its 
terror machine and its expansion and aggression" . Netanyahu said that "The world is a much 87
more dangerous place today than it was yesterday", undelining the role of Tehran as "sponsor 
of international terrorism", and calling the government a "terrorist regime" which wants "to 
destroy Israel" . Israeli Prime Minister defined Hezbollah "Iran's terrorist proxy". 88
 Russia and China - allies in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa) group - voted against the formal UN Security Council condemnations of the Bashar 
al-Assad government, since 4 October 2011, expressing four times the negative vote on 
Middle East-Syria resolutions . Until now Moscow, which has its only Mediterranean naval 89
base for its Black Sea Fleet located in the Syrian port of Tartus, opposed any sanctions or 
intervention against the Syrian government, using its veto power to block any action against 
the Assad regime.  
 The Russian government admitted that have "long supplied Syria with weapons and 
hardware" and that "There are Russian military experts who help Syrians" . According to che 90
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs "two thousand Russian citizens are fighting on the side of 
extremist formations in Syria and Iraq". Russian President Putin said Moscow wants 
"to create an international coalition to combat terrorism and extremism", and that he 
personally discussed this over the telephone with the President of the United States, President 
of Turkey, the leaders of Saudi Arabia, the King of Jordan, the President of Egypt and other 
partners . The "broad coalition that President Vladimir Putin has urged to establish […] 91
should include units of Syrian moderate opposition, Kurdish self-defence forces and major 
international regional players that are aware of the extremely serious threat emanating from 
the ISIS and other terrorist groups" . Putin told that Russians are backing their "friends" and 92
"providing Syria with significant support anyway, both in equipment and armaments 
and in personnel training" . 93
 Between Ankara and Tel Aviv, whose prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been 
accused of "Islamophobic attitude" , distances remain large because of Palestinians killed in 94
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Israel's offensives in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Turkish President Erdoğan condemned 
"the atrocities of Israel" and "the occupation and the aggressive policies of Israel" and called 
for "a sovereign and independent Palestinian state […] with east Jerusalem as its capital" . 95
 Turkey, "which has always been one of the strongest defenders of the Palestinian 
cause" , emphasizes its "full support for Palestinian people and state"  and "will continue to 96 97
stand by its Palestinian brothers" . President Erdoğan said that "Protecting Jerusalem and Al 98
Haram Ash Sharif is the duty of all Muslims, not only of Palestinians. Turkey will continue to 
fight against the unlawful and unrestrained acts of Israel in cooperation with the Muslim 
world […]" . 99
 Turkey is playing a game alone, without allies, against the blockade of powers formed 
by Russia, Iran and China, and against Egypt, another regional secular government, with 
which Israel maintains a very friendly relationship.  
 The Egyptian Revolution of 2011, part of the Arab Spring, which saw the overthrow of 
President Hosni Mubarak, led to fears in Israel about the future of the 1979 peace treaty 
between the two countries , until the Egyptian Army took power on 11 February 2011. The 100
fear of Tel Aviv was that the new Muslim government would transform Egypt into a new Iran. 
These fears dissolved in 2012, when the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) declared their devotion to 
the Camp David Accords, respecting the peace treaty. 
 The situation in Egypt suddenly changed in July 2013, when the secular military oust 
Muslim Brotherhood from power. The new balance of power changes the relationships within 
the Arab world. 
 Mohamed Morsi, at that time President of the Muslim Brotherhood, sworn in as fifth 
and first democratically elected President of Egypt, and served from 30 June 2012 to 3 July 
2013 when was removed by then Defense Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. El-Sissi run for presidential elections 2014, held without the 
participation of most political parties, and won over his sole opponent. 
 Morsi as well as high-echelon MB leaders were charged with "terrorism and plotting 
with foreign militants against Egypt" while the MB was officially classified by the 
government as a terrorist group in April 2014  implementing a a decision by the Court of 101
Urgent Matters in February . The only countries designating the MB as a terrorist 102
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organization are: Russia - on 12 February 2003 the Supreme Court of Russia banned the 
Muslim Brotherhood, labeling it as a terrorist organization, and accusing the group of 
supporting Islamist rebels who want to create an Islamic been in the North Caucasus; Syria 
(21 October 2013), Egypt (25 December 2013), Saudi Arabia (7 March 2014) and United 
Arab Emirates (UAE; 9 March 2014). Saudi Arabia has listed the Muslim Brotherhood as a 
terrorist organisation along with two al-Qaeda-linked groups fighting in Syria: Jabhat al-
Nusra, which is al-Qaeda's official Syrian affiliate, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL), which has been disowned al-Qaeda, as "terrorist organisations" . 103
 The countries that have entered the Muslim Brotherhood in the list of terrorist 
organizations are those that praidsed the crackdown against Islamists, put in place by el-Sissi, 
who came to power after the military coup d'état that deposed the legitimate President Morsi. 
Egypt urged the European countries "not to deal with illegal entities affiliated to the terrorist 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) group" , as the European Union  and many governments, 104 105
including the USA , UK , Australia , New Zealand , Canada , Japan  and 106 107 108 109 110 111
Germany  among the others, does not recognize it as such. 112
 In recent years the Muslim Brotherhood changed its strategy and has always 
condemned as "criminal and unjustifiable" any attack, rejecting and denouncing all kind of 
violence.  This position is shared by Ḥizb Al-Ḥurriya Wal-'Adala (the Freedom and Justice 113
Party), founded in 2011 by the Muslim Brotherhood, and banned and dissolved formally by 
order of the Egyptian Supreme Administrative Court on 9 August 2014, after the MB 
organization's activities have been banned by an Egyptian Court in September 2013  and 114
afterwards by the government . 115
 Russia has supported Sisi's actions since day one, including his presidential bid, and 
reportedly offered Egypt a huge military weapons deal after the United States suspended some 
military aid and postponed weapons delivery to Egypt . The USA - which have not listed the 116
Muslim Brotherhood among the terrorist organizations  - took an ambiguous position, 117
avoiding to define the action of the Egyptian Armed a coup d'état, but decided to frozen 
military aid. Many foreign govermnents see el-Sissi as a bulwark against Islamic extremis in 
the region. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have given more than 
20 billion USD to help Egypt since Morsi's overthrow .  118
  16
 As reported, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia was the first international head of State to 
send a message of congratulations to interim Egyphtian President Adly Mansour: "We 
strongly shake hands with the men of all the armed forces, represented by General Abdel 
Fattah el-Sissi" . Foreign Minister of UAE Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan said that his 119
government was "satisfied" with the developments in Egypt. Al Nahyan also praised the 
Egyptian army as a "strong shield" and a "protector" .  120
 El-Sissi's standing makes him also an ally of Israel against the Islamic movement 
Hamas, "a Palestinian offshoot of the parent Muslim Brotherhood" . At the end of 2014, 121
Egypt's Prosecutor General filed a lawsuit against Hamas' military arm Ezzedin Al Qassam, 
intending to declare Hamas a terrorist organization and outlaw its activity. Hamas claims that 
the directive to the Prosecutor General originated from Egyptian President al-Sisi himself . 122
The move comes after a serie of terror attacks in northern Sinai. Former members of the 
dissolved Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, who established the Sinai Province of ISIL or Wilayat Sinai, 
claimed responsibility, but according to Egyptian intelligence, Hamas was actively involved 
the terror attack by smuggling explosives and its fighters through Gaza's tunnels , even if 123
the Islamic Resistance Movement denied connection to any attack in the Sinai Peninsula . 124
 Ousted President Morsi and the majority of the Brotherhood leaders have been 
imprisoned and referred to criminal court by prosecutors for different charges. In Egypt  a 125
wide and vaguely-defined range of terrorism-related offenses not necessarily resulting in 
death are punishable by death . The new anti-terror law adopted in August 2015  has been 126 127
criticized by a number of countries and foreign human rights organizations  The Egyptian 128
Foreign Ministry remarked criticism: "There is no universally agreed definition of terrorism" 
as "It is therefore up to every domestic jurisdiction to develop its own definition" said 
Spokesman Ahmed Abu Zeid .  The Ministry highlighted that "Legislators also referred to 129
many anti-terror laws in a number of countries" such as the US Patriot Act, the UK Terrorism 
Act (2000) and the series of counter-terrorism laws adopted by France and the Arab 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, adopted by the League of Arab States in 1998.  130
Many African counties such as Tunsia  adopted new counterterrorism law which erodes 131
basic rights, undermining freedom of expression and opinion throughout. 
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 In June 2015 Morsi has been sentenced lifetime imprisonment for espionage and 16 
Muslim Brotherhood leaders have been sentenced to death in a trial for jail break . 132
According to the Court ruling the Muslim Brotherhood planned "to form terrorist 
organizations for armed interference in Egypt" in cooperation with Hamas e Hezbollah. The 
Cairo Criminal Court indicates a link between the '"eaders of the MB international 
organization who are associated with Hamas movement, Hezbollah and Iran", stressing that 
the Libanese group "is associated with the Iranian revolutionary guard" . 133
 Turkey has been the only country to react strongly to the death sentence against "the 
democratically elected President Mohamed Morsi in Egypt" , issued on 16 May 2015 by an 134
Egyptian court, for his role in the Wadi el-Natrun prison break during the 2011 revolution . 135
"Egypt is returning to the old Egypt"  said Erdoğan. He called it "a punishment targeting the 136
ballot box" , and attacked el-Sissi, defined "a coup-maker" . The Turkish President 137 138
criticized the silence of the West, and stated that "If Morsi is executed, I believe and hope he 
won't be, he will reach the rank of martyrdom in his fight against terror" . The Head of the 139
Turkish Republic "do not accept Sisi as the President of Egypt", recognizing still in office 
Morsi, who "was elected with 52 percent of the votes" . "To me, the President of Egypt is 140
Morsi, not Sisi"  stressed Erdoğan. 141
Turkey aims to "be much more powerful in 2023" , according to the political vision 142
described is a list of goals released by the party of then Prime Minister Erdoğan, to 
coincide with the centenary of the Republic of Turkey in 2023 , and the loss of power of the 143
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt wrecks the dream of an Islamic confessional bloc able to 
influence the regional policy: a new Caliphate.
 The position to be adopted on the matter of the Muslim Brotherhood splits the Arab 
world. Between the Wahhabi Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Qatar there are strong clutches, 
right on the position to be adopted over such organizations as the Muslim Brotherhood, which 
the government of Doha continued to back, denouncing what the Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin 
Hamad Al-Thani described as a 'military coup' that had taken place in Egypt in July 2014 . 144
The crisis between the the Gulf Cooperation Council lead to the withdrawal from Doha of the 
ambassadors of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Kingdom of Bahrain 
in March 2014 . Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar has been accused of financing and supporting 145
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terrorist groups through private donors and charity organisations, even if no evidence were 
found . 146
 In July 2015 the government of Riyadh arrested 431 people accused to be part of a 
"network of cluster cells linked to the terrorist ISIS organization" , but, after the death of 147
King Abdullah, his successor, Salman bin Abdul-Aziz, seems to make a break through in the 
internal and external Saudi policies toward Islamists: Khaled Meshal, leader of Hamas 
political bureau and member of Muslim Brotherhood since 1971 , met the new king , and 148 149
visited the country . The news of Meshal's visit to Riyadh came a few days after president of 150
Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Saudi Arabia and met with King Salman . A few days 151
before Erdoğan received the Head of Hamas Politburo. at the Presidential Complex in 
Ankara . 152
 Saudi Arabia is engaged in Yemen, where leads the Arab coalition, including UAE, 
Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait, to support the forces loyal to the government of Abd Rabbuh 
Mansur Hadi against the fighters of the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. In Yemen 
members of Ansar al-Sharia had pledged allegiance to ISIL, entering into direct competition 
with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), threatening the Saudi borders. As happened 
in Syria, and somehow in Iraq and Libya, the IS takes advantage of of inter-state conflicts to 
gain positions and control territory. In Yemen the Arab countries are allied with the United 
States and Turkey: all they fear the destabilization of the area. Moreover, the location of 
Yemen is strategic for controlling the entrance to the Gulf of Aden, through which passes the 
Persian Gulf oil. This makes it a point geographically vital for world economy. 
Conclusions 
The situation that arised with the advance of the Islamic State sees asymmetrical alliances: on 
one side, Russia is an ally of Turkey and Iran in supporting the regime in Damascus; on the 
other Russia is an ally of Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirate in considering 
the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, with Ankara and Doha strongly contrasting 
the current regime in Cairo. Many foreign govermnents see el-Sissi as a bulwark against 
Islamic extremis in the region. 
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 The military coup d'état at Cairo, while resealed the Rafah crossing between Gaza and 
Egypt to the advantage of the security of Israel, has dismissed the dream of the rebirth of a 
modern 'legal' Caliphate led by Turks and Egyptians. If it's true that "Egypt is returning to the 
old Egypt", Turkey is returning to old Turkey, too. Islamic Turkey seeks to gain regional 
leadership, taking advantage of the advance of the jihadists in Syria and Iraq. Ankara formed 
an alliance with the KRG to weaken the Baghdad government and overshadow Kurdish 
nationalists, which recorded a huge success at the recent Turkish general elections, depriving 
Erdoğan of the parliamentary majority needed to change the constitution to empower his role. 
 In the meantime the interests of Moscow and Tehran, allied with Beijing in support of 
Damascus, converge in an anti-Turkish and anti-Saudi path. The further enlargement of the 
EU, with the entrance of Ankara, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), is a threat to the influence in the region of Russia, Iran, and China, which already 
must counteract Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies. To Moscow and Tehran, Turkey is also an 
antagonist, because of the role that Ankara is taking on as a European energy hub. In the 
background, the contrast between IS and the Muslims 'traitors' who strayed from the Sharia 
and the Caliphate that also Ankara would resurrect. The political struggle thus takes the form 
of a contrast between the current strong man in Cairo, el-Sissi, and Turkish President 
Erdoğan, as well as involving religious differences between Shiites, Sunnis and Wahhabis. 
 While Washington opposes Tehran's nuclear program and the expansive policy of 
Moscow in Ukraine, is allied with Russia and Iran to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, 
although it can not count on the vote of these for the approval of resolutions by the UN 
Security Council. In the background are the relations between Tel Aviv and Washington, and 
the struggle for the regional leadership. 
 Creating a deep rift between the Muslim countries, the Islamic State suits Israel, which 
however sees the jihadists advancing in the Gaza Strip, where the latter are opposed by 
Hamas, now openly backed also by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the Russian Federation. It is a 
conflict entirely within the Islamic world. The jihadists are too busy fighting Arab foes, to 
deal with the Zionists. Even Hezbollah, Tehran's historic ally and enemy of Israel, pledged 
support the Assad regime and support the government in Baghdad. Israel is therefore in the 
position of a 'free rider': its security is ensured by the clash within the Muslim world. 
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 Riyadh is also committed to fighting the jihadists of the Islamic State, and seeks to 
maintain leadeship between the Gulf countries, and to remain the main ally of Washington in 
the region, while the new Saudi king redesigns alliances in the Arab world. The fear of the 
Saudis, as well as that of the Israelis, is that the negotiations between Washington and Tehran 
on the nuclear bring to reshape alliances in the Middle East: King Salman is approaching the 
'turkish block' linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, in terms of preventive 
containment of Iran and Hezbollah, while Russia and China play on both tables, and the 
Egypt, isolated, remains the only 'independent' ally of Washington and Tel Aviv. In the 
background, the remains of Syria, Iraq and Libya to be divided among the contenders. In 
midst of all this the Islamic State prospers and franchisees worldwide. 
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